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On Ending the Battle of the Forms:
Problems with Solutions
By CORNEmILL A. STEPHENS*
INTRODUCTION
In the typical commercial sale of goods, the contract of sale is
not memorialized by a single written document executed jointly by
the buyer and seller. Usually the contract is formed by an exchange
of forms between buyer and seller. The buyer normally initiates
the transaction by sending the seller a "purchase order." The seller
then replies to the purchase order by sending a "sales acknowledg-
ment," an "invoice," or some other commercial reply form.'
Subsequent to (or contemporaneous with) sending the reply, the
seller ships the goods.2 Both the seller's form and buyer's form
generally contain a description of the goods, the price, the delivery
terms, and the quantity to be purchased. Once those "basic" terms
are agreed upon, the parties believe they have a "deal." 3
Although the buyer's form and seller's form are in accord on
the aforementioned "basic" terms, each party's form also usually
contains additional preprinted terms called "boilerplate." Boiler-
plate terms are preprinted, standard, formulaic terms used in all
of a party's sales transactions. The boilerplate terms usually have
not been mentioned in any preliminary negotiations between the
parties and, in fact, usually are not even considered by the parties. 4
Of course, the boilerplate contained in the seller's form is designed
to protect the interests of the seller while the boilerplate contained
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A. 1973,
Claremont College; J.D. 1976, University of Chicago Law School.
I See E. Hunter Taylor, U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Integration of Legal Abstractions
and Transactional Reality, 46 U. CN. L. R-v. 419, 421 (1977).
2 The transaction is occasionally initiated by the seller, who sends the buyer a
"quotation form." The buyer then responds by sending the seller a purchase order.
3 See Frederick D. Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An .Analysis of
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAw. 789, 791-92 (1969).
4 See John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another
Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 597, 604 (1978) [hereinafter
Murray, Incipient Unconscionability].
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in the buyer's form is designed to protect the interests of the buyer.
As a result, the boilerplate contained in the parties' respective
forms usually conflicts. The most common and problematic con-
flicting terms relate to warranties, exclusion or limitation of rem-
edies, and arbitration. The seller's boilerplate, for example, may
disclaim the warranties provided by the Uniform Commercial Code5
("U.C.C." or "Code") 6 by limiting, modifying, or excluding the
buyer's remedies and/or damages 7 or by requiring arbitration., To
compound the problem, it is not unusual for each party's form to
provide that such form exclusively sets forth the entire contract
between the parties.
Given the parties' boilerplate inconsistencies and the fact that
often each form provides that it exclusively constitutes the contract
of the parties, the question then becomes what happens when one
party, before performance, seeks to "renege" on the deal. Specif-
ically, does the conflict between the purchase order and the ack-
nowledgment (or invoice) show that there was never a meeting of
the minds, and therefore, no contract? If despite the conflicting or
variant terms, there is a contract, then what is the contract? The
seller's terms? The buyer's terms? A hybrid? Further, if there is
no binding contract because of the variant terms, but the parties
perform the contract anyway, is there then a contract? If so, and
a dispute arises relating to one of the conflicting terms in the
parties' forms, does one party's form prevail over the other? If
so, why? If not, then what constitutes the contract?
This contest between the buyer's form and the seller's form,
including the related questions regarding the precedence of each
form, is commonly called the "battle of the forms." This Article
examines the pre-Code and Code approaches to the battle of the
forms and the problems with each. This Article then concludes
with a proposed revision to the Code that the author believes more
- Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the 1990 Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
6 For example, U.C.C. § 2-312 warrants that the seller has good title and that the
seller's goods are free of any claim or infringement; U.C.C. § 2-313 addresses express
warranties given by the seller; U.C.C. § 2-314 provides that a merchant-seller implicitly
warrants the merchantability of goods sold; and, U.C.C. § 2-315 provides that under certain
circumstances the seller implicitly warrants that goods sold are fit for the particular purpose
required by the buyer.
7 U.C.C. § 2-719 expressly provides that the parties' contract may alter remedies and
damages, including consequential damages.
The Code is silent on arbitration. Consequently, if the contract is also silent on the
subject of arbitration, arbitration is not required.
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satisfactorily resolves the battle of the forms than both the pre-
Code and current Code solutions.
I. THE PRE-CODE SOLUTION
Under pre-Code law, a reply to an offer was effective as an
acceptance only if the terms of the reply were the mirror image of
the terms of the offer.9 If the reply contained terms that were
additional to or different from the terms contained in the original
offer, no matter how insignificant or inconsequential the deviation,
the reply was ineffective as an acceptance. 10 In such situations, the
reply was treated as a counteroffer that rejected the original offer."
This pre-Code common law approach was known aptly as the
"mirror image" rule.1 2
With regard to commercial sales, as indicated above, rarely
does the preprinted form of the buyer (containing the buyer's
boilerplate) exactly "mirror" the preprinted form of the seller
(containing the seller's boilerplate). Accordingly, under the mirror
image rule, even if the seller intends to accept the buyer's offer,
sends a reply to the buyer that "accepts" the buyer's offer, and
the buyer interprets the seller's reply as an acceptance, unless the
boilerplate terms (or any other terms for that matter) of the parties'
respective documents exactly mirror each other, no contract is
created. Rather, the reply of the seller (typically, the acknowledg-
9 See, e.g., Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co., 371 P.2d 74, 77 (Or. 1962) ("[A]cceptance
must be 'positive, unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous, and must not change, add
to, or qualify the terms of the offer."' (quoting Wholesale Co. v. Hackbarth, 201 P. 1066,
1067 (Or. 1921))); see also 1 SAMUmL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON TE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
72, at 235 (3d ed. 1957).
"0 See, e.g., Minar v. Skoog, 50 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. 1951) (An acceptance to be
valid and to rise to a binding contract, must be made in unequivocal and positive terms
which comply exactly with the requirements of the offer.).
" See Gram v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 91 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1950); Novik
v. Bartell Broadcasters, 334 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 295 N.E.2d 797
(N.Y. 1973); Machinery Util. Co. v. Fry, 231 N.Y.S. 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928); Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Carthage-Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 206 N.Y.S. 676 (N.Y. App. Div.
1924), aff'd, 152 N.E. 430 (N.Y. 1926); Arnold v. Gramercy Co., 218 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 224 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 185 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y.
1962); Ruane v. Smith, 159 N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
32 The case that is generally considered the classic example of mechanical application
of the mirror image rule is Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y.
1915). In Poel, the court held that a party's response that purportedly "accepted" the other
party's offer, but added the requirement that the "acceptance" be promptly acknowledged,
was a change in the offer rendering the response ineffective as an acceptance. Hence, the
"acceptance" was treated as a counteroffer. See Poel, 110 N.E. at 622; see also ROBERT J.
NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 37 (1970).
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ment or invoice) is deemed a counteroffer. Consequently, neither
the seller nor the buyer is bound to perform, even though both
parties intended to create a binding contract and believed that a
binding contract existed.
In the abstract, the mirror image rule may have some surface
appeal because of its certainty, stability, and predictability. It does
not bind the offeror to any additional or different terms imposed
by the offeree, and it does not bind the offeree to the original
terms of the offer when the offeree has imposed additional or
different terms. However, the mirror image rule is based on the
assumption that the buyer and the seller not only know all of the
terms of the other's document but also know all of the terms in
their own document. 13 Such an assumption may have been valid at
a time when each and every term in a commercial sales contract
was personally negotiated.1 4 However, such an assumption is con-
trary to modern commercial realities, where the volume, complex-
ity, time, costs, and speed requirements of commercial transactions
render such knowledge and negotiations impracticable.' 5
In today's typical commercial sales transaction, once the basic
terms-description, price, quantity, and delivery-are agreed upon,
the parties believe that they have a contract. As a result, there is
no line-by-line comparison of the forms to determine whether their
respective boilerplate contains different or additional terms. More-
over, large sellers and buyers deal with hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of parties per year, each one using its own form. The sheer
volume of transactions in which two or more forms are exchanged
by the parties precludes management from being involved in every
sales transaction. The time and expense that would be required to
analyze and negotiate each term on each form individually would
be astronomical, especially in light of the relatively few disputes
that result from such sales transactions. The use of preprinted,
boilerplate laden forms allows lower-level employees to conduct
sales transactions and enables the parties to institute standard
13 See Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 4, at 609.
14 See Paul Barron & Thomas W. Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection
and Revision, 24 Cmv. ST. L. Rav. 171, 176 (1975).
,S See John E. Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CoRNELL L. Rav. 735 (1982); see also Murray, Incipient Uncons-
cionability, supra note 4; John E. Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. Rnv. 269 (1972) [hereinafter Murray, Realism of Behaviorism];
John E. Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am.
Soc. R v. 55, 59 (1963).
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procedures for handling transactions, thereby lowering costs. In
sum, the risks to the parties in using such preprinted forms are far
outweighed by their efficiency and economic advantages. Conse-
quently, both parties to the transaction normally use their own
preprinted forms to structure the transaction. Once agreement is
reached on the aforementioned basic terms, the parties assume that
there is a binding, enforceable contract, notwithstanding the exis-
tence of variant terms in their respective forms. 16
Besides the fact that, as shown above, application of the mirror
image rule ignored the intent of the parties to enter into a contract,
by literally exalting form over substance, what was particularly
distressing about application of the rule was that it allowed a party
to refuse to perform if that party found the slightest variation
between the offer (purchase order) and reply (invoice or acknow-
ledgment), no matter how trivial the variation. Once the variation
was discovered, the recalcitrant party could refuse to consummate
the transaction, with immunity, by alleging that a legally enforce-
able and binding contract was never formed.17 Hence, a party was
allowed to renege on the deal not because of any true problem
with a variant term, but rather, because of an unfavorable change
in market conditions developing after the forms were exchanged. 8
An even more disturbing consequence ensued when there was
no contract under the mirror image rule, but the seller and buyer
nevertheless performed.' 9 In such a case, the acknowledgment (or
invoice), although ineffective as an acceptance, was effective as, a
counteroffer. Thus, the buyer's acceptance of the goods constituted
an acceptance of the seller's counteroffer. Similarly, if a seller
initiated the transaction by sending one of its forms (e.g., a price
," See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Reaction
Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa.), amended,
588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d
520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
,1 Karl Llewellyn, irritated by the courts' interference with the manifest intention of
the parties to be bound by the contract despite the existence of non-matching boilerplate,
stated that such "unhappy cases which would find a condition where no businessman would
find one [should be] carefully disapproved." I STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REviSION COM-
MISSION REPORT, HEARINas ON THE UIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 55 (119) (William S. Hein
& Co. 1980) (1954).
" See Raisler Heating Co. v. Clinton Wire Cloth Co., 168 N.Y.S. 668, 669 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1918) (After the market price of the subject goods had doubled, the seller sought
to withdraw from the transaction.).
19 That would occur, for example, if the seller's acknowledgment had not exactly
mirrored the buyer's purchase order, but the parties, believing there was a binding contract,
had performed anyway.
1991-92]
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quotation) to the buyer, and the buyer thereafter responded by
sending the seller a purchase order containing variant terms, the
purchase order was deemed to be a counteroffer, shipment by the
seller would constitute acceptance of the buyer's counteroffer. 20
Thus, the contract was controlled by whichever party fired the
"last shot" (sent the last document) before performance. 2 That is,
when performance occurred, the "last shot" doctrine mechanically
gave preference to the party sending the last document.
The application of the mirror image rule and the last shot
doctrine resulted in a "contract" that often contradicted the par-
ties' true intentions. If, before performance, both parties under-
stood that the offeree intended to accept the offer when it sent its
response which contained a variant term, the mirror image rule
thwarted that intention by allowing either party to back out of the
deal. On the other hand, if the parties performed, the terms of the
contract were determined by whichever party's form was received
before the receiving party performed an act that could be deemed
an acceptance of that form (e.g., accepting the goods, making
payment, shipping the goods, etc.). Thus, the terms of the last
form, rather than the intent of the parties, controlled the contract.?"
The mirror image rule and the last shot doctrine left the original
offeror (typically the buyer) in the unenviable posture of being
subject to contract terms to which it never agreed, if it chose to
go through with the deal, while having no enforceable contract
rights if the offeree refused to perform.
II. THE CODE SOLUTION
Application of the mirror image rule and the last shot doctrine,
the pre-Code solutions to the battle of the forms, was mechanical,
rigid, and harsh. By ignoring the true intentions and expectations
of the parties, use of those common law doctrines often led to
results that were not only unjust* but also detrimental to com-
merce. U.C.C. § 2-207, recognizing the realities of modem com-
20 1 WILLISTON, supra note 9, at 237.
21 See, e.g., Garst v. Harris, 58 N.E. 174 (Mass. 1900); Doerr v. Woolsey, 5 N.Y.S.
447 (C.P.N.Y. 1889); see also William D. Hawkland, The Buyer's Purchase Order Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 PRAc. LAW. 25 (1965).
2 3 RIc RD W. DUESENBERO & LAWRENCE P. KiNo, SA.Es AND BuLK TRANsFERs
UNDER THE UNIFORM COwMRCIAL-CODE § 3.02 (1990).
21 As Professors Calamari and Perillo have commented: "The [mirror image] rule has
been enforced with a rigor worthy of a better cause." JoHN D. CALAMART & JosEPH M.
PERiuo, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 2-22, at 68 (2d ed. 1977).
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mercial transactions and the reasonable expectations of the parties,
was designed to resolve the battle of the forms by repudiating those
hoary and rigid common law doctrines of mirror image and last
shot.Y It seeks to bind the parties to their agreement, despite
discrepancies between offer and reply.2 U.C.C. § 2-207 was meant
"to harmonize statutory law with modern commercial practices. ' 26
In its entirety, U.C.C. § 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time op-
erates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to
or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance
is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance toL the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although
the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.
In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this Act. 27
A cursory reading of U.C.C. § 2-207 could cause one to con-
clude that the Code had, at long last, clearly and equitably ended
See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 757 (Cal. 1977).
21 See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Album
Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); American Parts
Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 154 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); see also
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEAiS 370 (1960) ("The
fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of
those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expression of agree-
ment .... ).
16 Charles M. Thatcher, Battle of the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207,
16 UCC L.J. 237, 241 (1984); see also Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F.
Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that the purpose of U.C.C. § 2-207 was to conform legal
rules and principles to the practices and expectations of modern business).
U.C.C. § 2-207.
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the battle of the forms. Ostensibly, it gives due consideration to
the intent and expectations of the parties, without arbitrarily giving
preference to either party's form. A closer reading of U.C.C. § 2-
207, however, reveals it to be a "puzzling, ' 28 "murky bit of
prose' 29 that is a "statutory disaster whose every word invites
problems in construction," 30 and "is incapable of generating con-
sistently defensible interpretations and results. ' 31 U.C.C. § 2-207
has even been compared to "an amphibious tank that was origi-
nally designed to fight in the swamps, but was ultimately sent to
fight in the desert." '3 2 The section further has been characterized
as "shrouded in uncertainty. ' 33 In short, U.C.C. § 2-207 "is a
defiant, lurking demon patiently waiting to condemn its interpreters
to the depths of despair." 34
21 Charles M. Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation and Content - An Annotated
Apology for a Proposed Revision of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, 32 S.D. L. Rnv.
181, 183 (1987) [hereinafter Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation].
29 Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18, 25 (Kan. 1970). -
30 Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. Rtv. 1217, 1224 (1982). Moreover, in a letter
to Professor Robert Summers, Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of the Code,
made the following statement regarding § 2-207:
The 1952 version of § 2-207 was bad enough ... but the addition of subsection
(3), without the slightest explanation of how it was supposed to mesh with (1)
and (2), turned the section into a complete disaster...
My principal quarrel with your discussion of § 2-207 - and all the other
discussions I have read - is that you treat the section much too respectfully -
as if it had sprung, all of a piece, like Minerva from the brow of Jove. The
truth is that it was a miserable, bungled, patched-up job - both text and
Comment - to which various hands - Llewellyn, Honnold, Braucher and my
anonymous hack - contributed at various points, each acting independently of
the others like the blind men and the elephant). It strikes me as ludicrous to
pretend that the section can, or should, be construed as an integrated whole
in light of what "the draftsmen" "intended." (I might note that, when
subsection (3) was added, Llewellyn had ceased to have anything to do with
the project).
Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), printed
in RiciARD E. SPEIDEL, ROBERT S. SUMMCERS & JAMES J. WMTE, COMMERCIL AND CONSUMER
LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
1, JAmms J. W=T & ROBERT S. Sumimas, UNIFORM COMMERCLuA CODE § 1-3, at 29
(3d ed. 1988).
'1 Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation, supra note 28, at 182.
'3 George M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and
Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 327,
328 (1983).
34 Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1104
(E.D. Pa.), amended, 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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A. U.C.C. § 2-207(1)
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or differ-
ent from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.31
Under U.C.C. § 2-207(1), the inflexible approach of the mirror
image rule is abolished by treating the offeree's response as an
acceptance "even though it states terms additional to or different
from [the offer]." The subsection recognizes as a contract a deal
that in commercial understanding has been closed.36 In other words,
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) focuses on whether there has been a bargain in
fact, not whether there has been a bargain in form.37
Initially, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) fails to delineate any criteria for
determining what constitutes a "definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance."138 Should one apply an objective standard by con-
" U.C.C. § 2-207(1). For an examination of the federal and state cases that discuss
which terms in the offeree's reply will make that reply "expressly conditional" within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 2-207(l), see Lee R. Russ, Annotation, What Constitutes Acceptance
"Expressly Made Conditional" Converting It to Rejection and Counteroffer Under UCC §
2-207(1), 22 A.L.R.4th 939 (1983).
36 As the section's comment provides: "[A] proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract." U.C.C. 2-207 cmt. 2.
17 Professor Murray calls this "intention over terms." See John E. Murray, Intention
Over Terms: An Exploration of U.C.C. 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Con-
tracts, 37 FoRDHAm L. REVIEw 317 (1969) [hereinafter Murray, Intention over Terms]; see
also Murray, Realism of Behaviorism, supra note 15, at 299. Professor Murray states:
In order for commercial practices to expand, i.e., to change, and in order for
the law to react effectively to these changes, courts must become accustomed
to digging into the nature of the practices surrounding the transaction. In
order for courts to determine what the bargain of the parties was, in fact,
courts must begin to empathize with the behavior patterns of the parties under
the particular circumstances of their transaction. This requires empirical veri-
fication which will, on many occasions, require courts to depart from the
documentary evidence of the transaction and consider other manifestations of
the parties and the surrounding circumstances to identify more precisely their
circle of assent. Parties do make agreements in fact and these are the agree-
ments which should be enforced - not the agreements mechanically constructed
from the printed pieces of paper which the parties happened to use as partial
tools.
Id.
SSee U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
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sidering whether a "reasonable person" would interpret the re-
sponse as a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance?"
Or, should one consider what the offeree subjectively intended?
Neither U.C.C. § 2-207 nor the related Comments provide even a
clue.3 9
A related problem is that U.C.C. § 2-207(1) fails to explain
what constitutes a "definite" expression of acceptance. Both U.C.C.
§ 2-207(2)40 and Comment 341 to U.C.C. § 2-207 recognize the
existence of a contract, even though the response contains terms
that materially alter the offer. Further, these sources provide that
such terms do not become part of the contract.4 2 Hence, a response
that contains a term that materially alters the offer can still be a
"definite . .. expression of acceptance" ;43 the objectionable sub-
ject term simply does not become part of the contract. However,
when the offeree sends a response that contains such terms, can
the offeree truly be said to have sent a "definite ... expression
of acceptance?" It would seem that, at best, there is only an
ambiguous expression of acceptance, and at worst, there is a def-
inite expression of non-acceptance (i.e., a rejection). The material
alteration, therefore, would seem to preclude the response from
being treated as an acceptance. There being no acceptance, there
should be no contract. This point is not addressed by either U.C.C.
§ 2-207 or the related Comments.
Moreover, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) suffers by the apparent gratuitous
reference to a "written confirmation." It is unclear why a "written
confirmation" was specifically mentioned. If the "written confir-
mation" accepts the offer, then it is already covered as an "ex-
pression of acceptance" under U.C.C. § 2-207(1). If the "written
confirmation" does not accept the offeror's offer, then it cannot
operate as an expression of acceptance, and, in fact, by definition,
it cannot even be a confirmation (i.e., it is not confirming an
agreement). 44
11 See id.; U.C.C. § 2-207 cmts. 1-7.
- See U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
41 See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
42 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2); U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3.
,3 See U.C.C. § 2-207(l)-(2).
" One commentator states that the reference to the written confirmation is "confusing
and unnecessary," and that the "fate of any variant terms stated in a written confirmation
should be determined under a standard governing the content rather than the formation of
a sales contract." Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation, supra note 28, at 184.
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U.C.C. § 2-207(2) provides:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received. 4
Under U.C.C. § 2-207(2), when the transaction is not between
merchants, 46 if the offeree's response contains additional terms
(i.e., terms that are in addition to those contained in the offer),
then the additional terms do not become part of the contract, but
rather are treated as proposals for addition to the contract. How-
ever, when the parties to the transaction are merchants, the addi-
tional terms become part of the contract except in the three above
listed situations. Like U.C.C. § 2-207(1), U.C.C. § 2-207(2) is
riddled with ambiguities.
The first question is whether U.C.C. § 2-207(2) was meant to
deal with both "additional and different" terms or only with
"additional" terms. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) allows an "expression of
acceptance" to be treated as an acceptance "even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon." 47 But, U.C.C. § 2-207(2) only refers to "additional" terms
when it addresses the status of variant terms in the response. A
literal interpretation of 2-207(2) suggests that "different" variant
terms can never become part of the contract.
However, this construction of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) conflicts with
Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-207, which provides that different terms
are not automatically excluded from the contract, but may, under
41 U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
41 The U.C.C. defines "merchant" as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction." Id. § 2-104(1). Therefore, a transaction is
between merchants if both parties are "chargeable with the knowledge or skill of mer-
chants." Id.
7 Id. § 2-207(1).
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certain circumstances become part of the contract. 48 It should be
noted, however, that although Comment 3 suggests that U.C.C. §
2-207(2) addresses both different and additional terms, a review of
the drafting history of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) reveals that "different"
was in one of the early drafts of U.C.C. § 2-207(2), but was later
removed.49
The omission of "different terms" in U.C.C. § 2-207(2), but
its inclusion in U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and Comment 3, has perplexed
both commentators and courts.5 0 Why does U.C.C. § 2-207(2) only
address the effect of "additional" terms? Were "additional" terms
meant to subsume "different" terms? How are "different" terms
to be treated?5
Assume that an offer is silent on the color of the goods to be
shipped, but the offeree's response contains a term that states that
the goods will be red. Is that color designation a different term?
Of course, it is. The designation of the color red is a term that is
" The Comment states:
Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement
depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they are such as materially
to alter the original bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed
to by the other party. If, however, they are terms which would not so change
the bargain they will be incorporated unless notice of objection to them has
already been given or is given within a reasonable time.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
41 In a May, 1951 meeting discussing the Proposed Final Draft No. 2, it was proposed
that "different" be added to both subsection (1) and subsection (2). The motion carried.
See Transcript of Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in
Joint Session with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 27-
28 (May 16-18, 1951). Karl Llewellyn added the words "or different" after "additional"
in subsection (2) in the copy of the Code he used at the meeting and noted that the change
had been adopted. Karl Llewellyn, The Karl Llewellyn Papers, J. XIII.l.a. (available in
University of Chicago Law School Library). The same amendment appeared in American
Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, U.C.C.,
May Meeting Revisions to Proposed Final Draft No. 2, at 6 (June 1951). However, the
November, 1951 Final Text Edition and the 1952 Official Draft of 2-207(2) did not include
"different."
"o See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 30, at 1240-45; Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 14, at 186; John E. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms". Solutions, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1354-66 (1986); Murray, Intention over Terms, supra note 37, at 328
n.23.
.' Three states, Montana, Wisconsin, and Iowa, avoided the problem by revising
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) to read, in pertinent part, as follows: "(2) The additional or different
terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract." See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 554.2207 (West 1967) (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-207 (1983) (emphasis
added); Wis. STAT. § 402-207 (1964) (emphasis added). However, two of the states returned
to the original formulation by later amending their statutes to delete "or different." See
IowA CODE Am. § 554-2207 (West 1974); Wis. STAT. § 402-207 (1969).
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different from any term in the original offer. The color designation
is also an additional term, for the offeree wants it added to the
contract because it was not in the original offer. Suppose, however,
that the offer provides that the goods to be shipped will be blue,
but the response provides that the goods will be red. Is the desig-
nation of the color red a different term? Again, because it differs
from what was in the offer, it is a different term. Is it an additional
term? The offeree wants it added to the contract, so it also is an
additional term. That the offeree also wants the offeror's color
term superseded by his own color term, and that the offeree's color
term conflicts with the offeror's color term, does not alter the fact
that the offeree's term is an added (or additional) term. The only
distinguishing feature between the first example and the second is
that in the first example, the offeree merely added a different term
and was content with that; in the second example, the offeree
added a different term with the intent of nullifying the conflicting
term of the offeror. The point is, the offeree has to add a different
term, which de facto renders a different term an additional term.
Consequently, "different" terms, of necessity, are "additional"
terms. Accordingly, because different terms are also additional
terms, it is submitted that no distinction should be made between
additional terms and different terms in applying U.C.C. § 2-207(2).52
It may be argued that there is a legitimate reason for distin-
guishing between different terms and additional terms. An addi-
tional term in a response does not conflict with any term in the
offer and, therefore, the response containing the additional term
may still be treated as an "expression of acceptance." However, a
different term in a response does conflict with a term in the offer
and, therefore, the response containing the different term cannot
be treated as an "expression of acceptance." The problem with
this argument is that neither U.C.C. § 2-207 nor the related Com-
ments address this issue. In fact, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) subverts this
argument by allowing a response that contains different terms to
operate as an "expression of acceptance."
Notwithstanding the above analysis and the suggestion of U.C.C.
§ 2-207(1) and Comment 3, few courts have held that the definition
of additional terms subsumes the definition of different terms.
Most courts have held that because U.C.C. § 2-207(2) refers only
52 See Ebasco Servs. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 759 n.5 (Cal. 1977) (en banc); Barron
& Dunfee, supra note 14, at 187.
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to additional terms, only "additional" terms, not "different" terms,
were intended to be covered.53
If different terms are not covered under U.C.C. § 2-207(2),
what effect, if any, do different terms have on the terms of the
contract? The weight of authority seems to say that when the terms
in the acceptance are different from the terms contained in the
offer, the different terms cancel each other out, or "knockout"
each other.5 4 This view, which is supported by Professor White, is
commonly called the "knockout rule." Because the different terms
are knocked out of the contract, the contract consists of the terms
upon which the parties agree, plus terms supplied from relevant
provisions of the Code. 55
The asserted basis for the knockout rule used in U.C.C. § 2-
207(2) is Comment 6.56 However, Comment 6, by its terms, is
expressly restricted to variant terms in conflicting confirmation
forms, that is, forms that confirm the existence of an agreement
when there has already been an offer and an acceptance. It does
not address what § 2-207(2) addresses, namely, variant terms in
the offer and acceptance themselves.57 Reliance on Comment 6 to
51 See Reaction Molding, 588 F. Supp. at 1289; American Parts, 154 N.W.2d at 5-
11; Tunis Mfg. Corp. v. Allen Knitting Mills, Inc., 386 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 424 (Wis.
1973).
,' See, e.g., Daitom, 741 F.2d 1569; Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
596 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1979); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Joslyn Corp., 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1015, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533, 538 (D. Kan. 1982); Lea Tai Textile Co. v.
Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Southern Idaho Pipe &
Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 567 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Idaho 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1056 (1978); Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Mach. Works, 359 N.W.2d 232,
236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 N.W.2d 34, 41 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1979); see also WHiE & SUmvmRs, supra note 31, at 33-34.
15 See, e.g., Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1574; Southern Idaho, 567 P.2d at 1254; St. Paul
Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83, 86 (N.D. 1985).
- See WmTE & StUMIMRS, supra note 31, at 33.
11 Comment 6 to Section § 2-207 provides:
If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are
proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion
has been assented to. Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties
conflict each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other
conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the
requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in subsection (2)
is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become a part of the contract.
The contract then consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms
on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including
subsection (2). The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under
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support the knockout rule in U.C.C. § 2-207(2) is, therefore,
misplaced.
Further, there is a problem implicit within Comment 6. Com-
ment 6, which purports to explain U.C.C. § 2-207(2), begins by
stating: "If no answer is received within a reasonable time after
additional terms are proposed, it is both fair and commercially
sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to.' '58
Comment 6, therefore, would lead one to believe that additional
terms become part of the contract unless the other party "answers"
such additional terms. U.C.C. § 2-207(2), however, directly con-
tradicts Comment 6 by excluding such additional terms in the case
of a non-merchant, and by excluding such additional terms in the
case of a merchant unless such terms are immaterial. Even then,
under certain circumstances, immaterial additional terms may also
be excluded.59
Comment 6, continues:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict
each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other
conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a
result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is
found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do
not become a part of the contract. The contract then consists of
the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the
confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including
subsection (2).60
That statement of the law also contradicts U.C.C. § 2-207(2). The
"knockout" of the conflicting terms from the contract, and the
supplementation of the contract by the Code, are not provided for
in U.C.C. § 2-207(2), but rather in U.C.C. § 2-207(3), which applies
only when the offer and reply do not establish a contract. 61
that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior oral agreement;
under this section a failure to respond permits additional terms to become
part of the agreement.
See also Warr & Summzas, supra note 31, at 34 ("In [Summers's] view Comment 6 applies
only to variant terms on confirming forms, not to variant terms on forms one which is an
offer and the other an acceptance . .
I3 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6.
59 For example, in the case of a merchant, additional immaterial terms are excluded
from the contract when the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
- Id. § 2-207 cmt. 6.
61 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) provides:
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Realizing that U.C.C. § 2-207(2) does not support use of the
knockout rule when different terms are contained in the acceptance,
Professor Summers argues for the use of the "fall out" rule. 62
Under the "fall out" rule, any different terms contained in the
acceptance simply "fall out"-they do not become part of the
contract. Very few cases, however, have adopted the "fall out"
rule. 63
In short, courts and commentators have provided us with three
different interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) as it relates to the
"different" versus "additional" terms distinction. One interpreta-
tion is that both "different" and "additional" terms are included
in U.C.C. § 2-207(2), and that U.C.C. § 2-207(2) applies to both. 4
Another view, shared by Professor White, is that "different" terms
are not included in U.C.C. § 2-207(2).65 Under this view, any
different terms in the documents are knocked out, and the contract
becomes the consistent terms in the parties' forms; any additional
necessary terms are supplied by the Code. Another interpretation,
shared by Professor Summers, is that "different" terms are not
included in U.C.C. § 2-207(2). Different terms "fall out" of the
contract. Under this view, the contract would be, therefore, the
original offeror's terms. 6
Another problem with U.C.C. § 2-207(2) is that although it
provides that, between merchants, additional terms that "mate-
rially alter" the contract do not become part of the contract,
nowhere does the Code define "material." Nor does the Code
indicate whether the additional terms must be material to both
parties or to only one party. As a result, a review of the cases
on "materiality" yields conflicting decisions. For example, some
courts have taken the position that an arbitration provision in
the offeree's response is a material alteration, 67 while other courts
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this Act.
62 See WE & SummEas, supra note 31, at 34.
63 See, e.g., Reaction Molding, 588 F. Supp. at 1289.
"See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
6See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 352
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972); In re Barclay Knitwear Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 44, 45
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have not;68 some courts have taken the position that an interest
term is a material alteration, 69 while other courts have not. 0
Although "material" is not defined, there are two Comments
to U.C.C. § 2-207 relating specifically to the question of material
alteration. Comment 4 cites examples of terms that are deemed to
alter the contract materially, 71 while Comment 5 cites examples of
terms that are not deemed to alter the contract materially.7 2 These
Comments indicate that in order to determine whether a term
materially alters a contract, one should look at whether there is an
"element of unreasonable surprise. ' 73
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 204 S.E.2d 834, 842 (N.C. 1974).
6 See, e.g., Medical Dev. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.
1973) (applying California law); American Parts, 154 N.W.2d at 16; Silverstyle Dress Co.
v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 292, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972)
(applying Georgia and Tennessee law).
"See, e.g., Eskay Plastics, Ltd. v. Chappeli, 660 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App.
1983).
, See, e.g., School Dist. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982).
71 U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 4 provides:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the
contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express
awareness by the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties
as that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances
in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of
90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by a cannery, where the
usage of the trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to the
seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any invoice when
due; a clause requiring that complaints be made in a time materially shorter
than customary or reasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 5 provides:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and
which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objec-
tion is seasonably given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging
slightly upon the seller's exemption due to supervening causes beyond his
control, similar to those covered by the provision of this Article on merchant's
excuse by failure of presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in advance any
reasonable formula of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a
reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a
purchase for sub-sale, providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a clause
providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's standard credit
terms where they are within the range of trade practice and do not limit any
credit bargained for; a clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which
fall within the customary trade tolerances for acceptance "with adjustment"
or otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable manner.
73 See id. § 2-207 cmts. 4-5.
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Unfortunately, however, some of the examples of clauses that
would "materially alter" the contract would not normally cause
unreasonable surprise, while some of the examples of nonmaterial
clauses could be expected to cause unreasonable surprise.74 For
example, Comment 4 provides that a term giving the seller the
right to cancel when the buyer fails to pay an invoice when due
materially alters the contract.75 However, the buyer's primary ob-
ligation is to pay an invoice when due. 6 When the buyer fails to
pay the invoice when due, among the seller's many remedies under
the Code is the right to cancel the contract. 7 Because the seller
already has the right to cancel the contract when the buyer does
not pay the invoice when due, it is inconceivable that putting such
a provision in the contract would be a material alteration or would
74 See 3 DUESENBERO & KING, supra note 22, § 3.03[1], at 3-25 to 3-26. Duesenberg
and King state:
When closely examined, this official explanatory comment on the term "ma-
terial" may create more problems in interpretation than it solves. If the
examples given are to serve as guidelines for identifying what is a material
term, quarrel may be raised with the inclusion among them of an additional
term which is nothing more than what, without its express statement, would
otherwise be implied under the Code. That is exactly what is involved when
the right of cancellation in the event of a buyer's failure to pay an invoice
when due is given as an example. Payment of the price when it is due is the
buyer's primary obligation of performance. Additionally, Section 2-703 spe-
cifically permits a seller to cancel where the buyer, among other things, fails
to make payment when due. If he does not pay when payment is due, should
he be heard to assert surprise at the expressed term?
The example of the Official Comment is poor from another analytical view.
If a term stated on a responsive document merely iterates what the law would
otherwise impose, it is arguably not an additional term. This would be true
whether the term were implied by operation of a Code section, through custom
and usage, prior course of dealing, or "any other means by which a matter on
which the parties are silent nonetheless becomes a part of their agreement. A
written provision which states what an agreement already includes is no
alteration at all. If it is no alteration, it cannot be either an additional term
or material. This is the underlying principle of the many common law decisions
that did not prevent a purported acceptance from operating as such simply
because a term was added which otherwise would have been implied by law.
The Comments to Section 2-207, discussing "material," seem to have slipped
up by including an example which even under the strict concepts of exact
acceptance under the common law would not likely have converted the accep-
tance into a counteroffer. And this in the Comments to a section allegedly
designed to liberalize the effects of the common law mirror image rule and to
clarify the pre-Code confusion!
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75 See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
76 See id. § 2-301.
" See id. § 2-703.
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result in unreasonable surprise .7  In fact, because the Code already
gives the seller the right to cancel upon the buyer's failure to pay
the invoice when due, such a term in the contract would not even
seem to be an alteration.7 9
Further, the problem with defining "material alteration" by
the use of examples is that it has a propensity to lead to absolute
and inflexible rules. In determining whether there has been a ma-
terial alteration, a court should have the discretion and flexibility
to consider multiple factors involved in the transaction, such as
the course of dealing"0 and course of performance8 between the
parties, the custom, usage, 82 and practice in the trade, the goods
involved, and the amount involved.8 3 Only by thoroughly consid-
ering all of the above factors can the court determine the true
intention of the parties and whether there has been a material
alteration.
C. U.C.C. § 2-207(3)
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) provides:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In
such a case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
11 See supra note 74.
See id.
0U.C.C. § 1-205(1) provides:
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to
a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
81 U.C.C. § 2-208(1) provides:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of
the agreement.
'2U.C.C. § 1-205(2) provides:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that
it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence
and scope of such usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that
such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing, the
interpretation of the writing is for the court.
81 See also Barron & Dunfee, supra note 14.
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any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this Act.8
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) focuses on the conduct of the parties when
the "writings do not otherwise establish a contract."85 It governs
when the parties' exchange of documents fails to establish a con-
tract, but the parties' conduct does. An examination of U.C.C. §
2-207(3), however, raises the question: What conduct by both
parties is sufficient to manifest a recognition of the existence of a
contract under U.C.C. § 2-207(3)? An exchange of contradictory
forms would be conduct by both parties. However, if no contract
is formed by the exchange of such forms under U.C.C. § 2-207(1),
then certainly the mere exchange of those same contradictory forms
cannot be said to establish a contract under U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
Although it may be suggested that conduct as used in U.C.C.
§ 2-207(3) contemplates the commencement of performance in
addition to an exchange of forms, such a suggestion raises a
problem as well. Suppose, for example, the parties' forms conflict
on the basic terms of the transaction (i.e., price, quantity, descrip-
tion of the goods, and delivery terms). Nevertheless, the seller
decides to commence performance, to wit, ship the goods, in
accordance with his own form, and the buyer accepts the goods.
Should that conduct of the seller and buyer, along with the ex-
change of the forms containing conflicting basic terms, be sufficient
to establish a contract under U.C.C. § 2-207(3)? If so, the conflict-
ing basic terms are "knocked out." The court would then be called
upon to decide the price, quantity, description, and delivery terms.
Obviously, the court's imposition of these basic terms, terms on
which the parties themselves did not agree, cannot lead to predict-
able results. When the parties have not agreed to all of the basic
terms, they do not have a "deal." The deal is not made until the
buyer accepts the goods on the seller's disparate basic terms. Ac-
cordingly, the seller's terms in that case should be the contract.
That is, when there clearly has been no meeting of the minds on
the basic terms, but the parties have performed, the buyer should
not be allowed to use U.C.C. § 2-207(3) to knock out the seller's
basic terms. Rather, the seller's basic terms should be treated as a
common law counteroffer, and the buyer's acceptance of the goods
should constitute acceptance of that counteroffer.
- U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
" Id.
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There is also disagreement about when to apply U.C.C. § 2-
207(3). The first approach is to apply U.C.C. § 2-207(3) when, for
any reason, no contract was formed under U.C.C. § 2-207(1), but
the parties' subsequent conduct recognized a contract. 6 This ap-
plication is consistent with a literal reading of U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
The second approach is much narrower. Under that approach, if
no contract is formed under U.C.C. § 2-207(1) because the offeree's
reply is not a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,"
but the parties subsequently perform, then U.C.C. § 2-207(3) ap-
plies. However, if no contract is formed under U.C.C. § 2-207(1)
because the reply, although a "definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance," was expressly made conditional on assent to the
variant terms, but the parties subsequently perform without such
assent, then U.C.C. § 2-207(3) does not apply. Rather, the reply
is treated as a common law counteroffer, and the offeror's subse-
quent performance constitutes acceptance of the offeree's terms. 87
Another problem with U.C.C. § 2-207(3) involves the meaning
of the phrase, "together with any supplemental terms incorporated
under any other provisions of the Act." ' s When U.C.C. § 2-207(3)
applies, the contract of the parties consists of the terms to which
the parties agree together with those aforementioned supplemental
terms. If U.C.C. § 2-207(3) is interpreted literally, then terms that
appear in only one of the parties' documents, and any conflicting
terms in both parties' documents, are automatically knocked out
of the contract. However, such an application of U.C.C. § 2-207(3)
would be unduly restrictive. Usage of trade,8 9 course of dealing, 9°
and course of performance9' should also be considered in deter-
mining whether a term is excluded or knocked out under U.C.C.
"See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972);
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewett-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
' See, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962);
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Conn. 1970); Bickett
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
" U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
See supra note 82.
10 See supra note 80.
" See supra note 81.
Course of performance differs from course of dealing in that course of dealing refers
to previous transactions between the parties on other contracts, whereas course of perform-
ance refers to repeated past conduct between the parties in the performance of the subject
contract. See Wilson v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 581 (8th Cir. 1980); Computer
Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
2 Wn=im D. HAwxLAND, U.C.C. SERmS § 2-208:02.
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§ 2-207(3).9 That is, a contract under U.C.C. § 2-207(3) should be
supplemented not only by express provisions of the Code when
appropriate but also by usage of trade, course of dealing and
course of performance. 93 This consideration and inclusion of usage
of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance in the
determination of the contract is also supported by U.C.C. § 1-
205(3), which provides that such surrounding circumstances should
"supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." '
III. A PROPOSAL
As shown above, neither the common law mirror image rule
and last shot doctrine, nor the current formulation of U.C.C. § 2-
207 satisfactorily resolves the battle of the forms. The mirror image
rule frequently frustrated the intentions and reasoiable expecta-
tions of the transacting parties by declaring the absence of a
contract where both parties had intended to contract. If the parties
chose to perform, the last shot doctrine dealt the parties another
cruel blow by arbitrarily declaring that a contract existed on the
offeree's (or whichever party sent the last document before per-
formance) terms.
U.C.C. § 2-207 recognized that in modern commercial trans-
actions, the mirror image rule and last shot doctrine were obsolete
and unfair. Primarily because of the time and expense involved,
commercial parties simply do not read and dicker over the boiler-
plate in standard form contracts. In recognition of that commercial
reality and the fact that parties may intend to contract even when
2 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance....
The definition of contract in U.C.C. § 1-201(11), which includes the
parties' "agreement," provides: " 'Contract' means the total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any
other applicable rules of law."
9S See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 14, at 198; Murray, Incipient Unconscionability,
supra note 4, at 623; Travalio, supra note 33, at 336-337, 370-372. But see C. Itoh & Co.
v. Jordan Int'l Co. (America) Inc., 552 F.2d 1228, 1237-38 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance cannot supplement the contract
under U.C.C. § 2-207(3)).
- U.C.C. § 1-205(3), with emphasis added, states:
A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation
or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
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their forms contain variant or inconsistent terms, U.C.C. § 2-207
abolished the mirror image rule and provided that despite certain
conflicts and discrepancies in the terms of the parties' forms, a
contract may still exist. 9 Further, when the parties chose to per-
form in the absence of a contract, U.C.C. § 2-207(3) abolished the
last shot doctrine by refusing to enforce arbitrarily the form of the
party sending the last response and by providing for a more neutral
approach.96
Notwithstanding the virtues of U.C.C. § 2-207, it has proven
to be rife with inconsistencies and ambiguities. In order to accom-
plish its intended purpose of recognizing and enforcing the reason-
able expectations and intentions of the parties,9 U.C.C. § 2-207
must be modified to eliminate its weaknesses. In that connection,
U.C.C. § 2-207 should be revised as follows:
§ 2-207 Additional and Different Terms
(1) A response to an offer which a reasonable person would
interpret as an acceptance, operates as an acceptance, even though
it states terms additional to or different from the offer, unless
such additional or different terms in the response are conspicuous
and appear on the first page of the response. Any additional or
different terms in the response are to be construed as proposals
for modification. 9
(2) Where no contract has been formed under subsection (1),
but the conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a
contract, a contract is created. The contract shall consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, any conspicuous
terms on the first page of the response, and any supplemental
terms incorporated under any other provision of this Act, includ-
ing usage of trade, course of performance, and course of deal-
ing.99
A. General Observations
Proposed § 2-207 would eliminate the uncertainties, ambigui-
ties, and inequities of the present U.C.C. § 2-207 and would more
effectively and efficiently reflect the intentions and expectations of
the parties. There would no longer be a reason to attempt to
See U.C.C. § 2-207; supra part II.A-B.
9U.C.C. § 2-207(3); supra part II.C.
9 See Thatcher, supra note 26, at 241.
" Proposed § 2-207(1) is a consolidated revision of U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and (2).
"Proposed § 2-207(2) is a revision of U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
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distinguish between "different" and "additional" terms-they
would be treated the same. Further, there would no longer be a
need to disingenuously rely on Comment 6 to support the "knock-
out rule" as opposed to the "fall out" rule when the exchanged
writings have established a contract.
Proposed § 2-207 essentially starts with the offeror's terms. If
the offeree accepts, but adds additional or different terms, those
terms are not part of the contract. The offeror thereby controls
his offer. If a particular term is important to the offeree, he need
only call it to the attention of the offeror by making it conspicuous
and placing it on the first page of the form.100 Because only
conspicuous terms on the first page of the response affect the
offer, the offeror would not be put to the time and expense of
carefully reading an entire printed form.
If there is a different or additional conspicuous term on the
first page of the response, there is no contract under Proposed §
2-207(1); the response containing that conspicuous term would not
operate as an acceptance. Consequently, if the offeror found the
conspicuous term in the response objectionable, he could refuse to
perform with immunity. If, however, the offeror chose to perform,
a contract would be created under Proposed § 2-207(2), and the
contract would consist of the agreed upon terms, the conspicuous
term, and any relevant Code provisions, including usage of trade,
course of performance and course of dealing. By expressly includ-
ing usage of trade, course of performance, and course of dealing
when the contract results from conduct, an attempt to reach the
intention of the parties is assured. Because the offeror chose to
perform despite the conspicuous term in the response, it is reason-
able to bind the offeror to that conspicuous term.
B. Addressing the Ambiguities of U. C. C. § 2-207
The uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in U.C.C. § 2-207
do not exist in Proposed § 2-207. Proposed § 2-207 has all the
virtues of U.C.C. § 2-207 but none of the concomitant vices.
,00 "Conspicuous" is used in Proposed § 2-207(1) as it is defined in U.C.C. § 1-
201(10):
"Conspicuous": A term of clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is
"conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for
decision by the court.
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Proposed § 2-207 does not use the ambiguous "expression of
acceptance,"' 01 and then leave it to the reader's imagination to
determine what constitutes an "expression of acceptance." Rather,
Proposed § 2-207 focuses on whether a reasonable person under
the circumstances would interpret the response as an acceptance.
To some extent, Proposed § 2-207 necessitates a case by case
analysis. However, its use will result in a more fair and accurate
determination of the intent and expectations of the parties, without
discouraging the use of preprinted, standardized forms.
Subjecting acceptance to the reasonable person standard also
obviates the necessity of determining whether an expression of
acceptance was "definite." Under U.C.C. § 2-207(1), the "expres-
sion of acceptance" has to be definite to operate as an accep-
tance.'0 Because the reasonable person standard is used in Proposed
§ 2-207(1), no determination need be made on the definiteness of
the response. Rather, the inquiry becomes whether a reasonable
person under the circumstances would view the response as an
acceptance.
The superfluous reference to "written confirmation" 1 3 has been
removed in Proposed § 2-207(1). If a response is truly a "written
confirmation," then a reasonable person could only view it as an
acceptance.
Unlike U.C.C. § 2-207(2), Proposed § 2-207(1) clearly applies
to both "different" and "additional" terms in the response. There-
fore, there is no need to attempt to distinguish between "different"
terms and "additional" terms in the response. This alleviates much
of the difficulty inherent in § 2-207, because this distinction is
often difficult, if not impossible, to make. Under Proposed § 2-
207(1), "different" and "additional" terms are treated the same.
Treating "different" terms the same as "additional" terms, and
making them both proposals, rather than incorporating them into
the contract, also obviates the quandary of whether to use the
"knockout" rule or the "fall out" rule. Other than the fact that
the Code inexplicably may have distinguished between "different"
and "additional" terms, there was no good reason to draw such a
dichotomy.104
101 Id. § 2-207(1).
102 See id.
1 Id.
10, One could argue, however, that when there is a different term in the response, the
response constitutes a rejection of the offer and a common law counteroffer, whereas when
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Under U.C.C. § 2-207(2), if the parties are merchants, addi-
tional terms that "materially alter" the contract do not become
part of the contract.10 5 However, material alteration is not defined
with regard to sales transactions. Proposed § 2-207(1) avoids the
problem of attempting to define "material alteration" by making
all different and additional terms, whether material or not, pro-
posals for modification to the contract, not a part of the contract.
Proposed § 2-207 more satisfactorily and predictably resolves
the question of what the contract is when the parties do not agree
on the basic terms, but perform anyway, thereby recognizing the
existence of a contract. Proposed § 2-207(2) expressly incorporates
usage of trade, course of performance, and course of dealing into
the contract to assure that all disputed terms, including basic terms,
can be more fairly ascertained. Further, when the offeree's basic
terms are conspicuous and located on the first page of the response,
and the offeror decides to perform anyway despite the conspicuous
conflicting basic terms of the offeree, the offeree's conspicuous
terms should, and under Proposed § 2-207(2) do, control.
Further, unlike U.C.C. § 2-207(3), there is no uncertainty about
whether Proposed § 2-207(2) applies when a response containing
variant terms is made expressly conditional on assent to the variant
terms.t1 Proposed § 2-207(2) broadly provides that it applies when-
ever the response does not operate as an acceptance.
Lastly, Proposed § 2-207(2) removes any doubt about whether
usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance may
be considered as part of the contract when the contract results
from the conduct of the parties rather than from an exchange of
forms. Proposed § 2-207(2) expressly incorporates usage of trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance into the contract.
CONCLUSION
At one time, parties to a commercial transaction negotiated
each and every term of the "agreement" until a final contract was
reached. It was in this simplistic setting that the common law
there is an additional term in the response, that response may still serve as an acceptance,
because no term in that response has expressly opposed a term in the offer.
I- See U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
,0, See U.C.C. § 2-207(3); see also Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d
497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962) (applying U.C.C. § 2-207 to resolve the problem); Universal Oil
Prods. Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Conn. 1970) (applying common
law of contracts without referencing U.C.C. § 2-207).
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doctrines of "mirror image" and "last shot" were born. Initially,
these two doctrines afforded the parties certainty and stability in
contract formation. As society grew and sales transactions multi-
plied and became more complex, the use of standardized preprinted
forms entered the battle of the forms. Both buyer and seller began
to utilize customarily their own standard forms to consummate the
sale. Rarely were the forms of the two parties consistent on all
terms. Inevitably, the mirror image rule had to fall in this setting
btcause parties neither had the time nor the resources to make
certain that each term in the original offer "mirrored" each term
in the response. In addition, application of the mirror image rule
frustrated the intention of the parties, who intended to enter into
a contract despite any variant terms in their respective forms. The
evolution of modern commercial sales transactions necessitated the
demise of the common law mirror image rule.
Likewise, as sales transactions became more sophisticated, the
last shot doctrine became equally outdated. Under the last shot
doctrine, the ultimate terms of the contract were determined by
the last form sent by one of the parties. Neither party, therefore,
could know the final terms of the contract until the last form was
sent. The arbitrariness of the last shot doctrine added more con-
fusion to commercial contracts instead of providing a meaningful
solution.
A major victory was won in the battle of the forms when the
Code was promulgated. The Code eliminated the obsolete common
law doctrines of mirror image and last shot. Under the Code, the
parties could have a binding contract despite the existence of
additional or different terms in their forms.
Although the Code gives parties a better remedy than the
aforementioned common law doctrines, it still does not provide
the best governance for the battle of the forms. The Code does
not indicate, inter alia, whether "different" terms and "addi-
tional" terms are to be treated the same. Moreover, the Code is
saturated with ambivalent, vague, and ambiguous language, which
provides no arsenal to a party attempting to win the battle of the
forms. Furthermore, the Code fails to incorporate expressly usage
of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance into the
determination of who wins the battle of the forms. Given the
magnitude of today's commercial sales transactions, such factors
cannot be overlooked. The Code simply falls short of providing a
thorough and intelligible solution to the battle of the forms.
By virtue of the numerous problems inherent in the mirror
image rule, the last shot doctrine, and U.C.C. § 2-207, a new
1991-921
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approach is needed to deal with the ever-raging battle of the forms.
Proposed § 2-207 is that new approach. Proposed § 2-207 effec-
tively eliminates the incentive to do battle with commercial forms,
while at the same time preserving fairness, certainty and predicta-
bility. Further, it takes into consideration the commercial reality
that in modem commercial transactions, standard forms are not
read by the parties to the transaction. Proposed § 2-207 does not
bind the offeror to the "fine print" in the offeree's form. At the
same time, it allows the offeree the option to deal only on its own
terms. In short, Proposed § 2-207 provides the artillery needed to
quell the battle of the forms once and for all.
